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HISTORICAL WATER USE AND THE
PROTECTION OF VESTED RIGHTS: A
CHALLENGE FOR COLORADO WATER
LAW
JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Population increases and finite supplies have combined to
put an increased strain on Colorado's water resources. Rapidly
growing cities and industries are searching for water for the
future. The costs-economic, political, and environmental--of
developing new supplies in the state are high. The era of federal
subsidies for large water projects is virtually over. Today,
municipal and industrial water supplies are provided primarily
through the process of acquiring senior, dependable agricultural
rights and transferring them to cities, ski areas, golf courses,
energy producers, or other new users.
In order for water to move from old uses to meet new
demands, an effective system for transferring water rights must
be in place.' Such a system would ideally involve low transaction
costs to encourage investment in the optimal development of the
state's water resources. It should provide predictability and
certainty in the scope of the transferred rights, and it should
recognize the interdependence of water rights2 by affording
reasonable protection to other users of the same water source.

* Professor of Law. University of Colorado School of Law. The author would
like to thank Jennifer Hunt and Rebecca Poage, both of the Class of 1998, for
valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Some economists have argued the advisability of letting the marketplace
determine water uses. See generally CHARLES J. MEYERS & RICHARD A.

POSNER, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS:
TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (1971); WATER RIGHTS

(Terry Anderson ed., 1983); H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water Law,
Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The ColoradoRiver, 23 J.L. & ECON. 111
(1980). For the opposite view, see Harrison C. Dunning, Reflections on the
Transferof Water Rights, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 109 (1977). It is not necessary to embrace
the market position in order to argue the merits of a smooth-running transfer
system.
2. Downstream users of water are normally supplied in part by the return flows
from upstream users.
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The transferee should retain the priority of the water right.3
Finally, it should be simple to administer, should serve the public
interest, and should treat the interests of the transferor, transferee, and other affected parties fairly and equitably.
In the process of transferring and changing a water right,4
measurement of the amount of water historically used by that
right is a critical element in determining the quantity which
can be transferred without injury to other water users. This
quantification is essential to any transfer plan as it provides the
key variable with which to assess the costs and benefits of the
proposed transfer. Inadequate analysis of historical utilization or ambiguity in the law as to how that historical use should
be measured can lead to uncertainty and confusion in the
administration of the transfer system. This uncertainty in the
system may dissuade creative transfer proposals and thereby
ultimately stand as an impediment to the efficient allocation of
water.
Part I of this article first examines the basic elements of
Colorado water law, in particular those dealing with water
transfers. It then discusses the limitations that the Colorado
courts have imposed on water rights on the occasion of their
transfer. Part II analyzes the doctrine of implied limitations,
under which courts revisit prior decrees authorizing water
transfers, and examines the leading case in this arena, Orr v.
Arapahoe Water & SanitationDistrict.5 Part III reviews some of
the principles of water measurement in the context of maximum
utilization of Colorado's water resources. The article concludes by
evaluating Colorado's approach to water rights transfers and
suggesting some principles to help insure continuation of an
effective transfer system.

3. As we shall see, under the Colorado system, priority is one of the
most important attributes of a water right. See infra text accompanying notes 6-11,
25-28.
4. Transferring and changing a water right, as used in this article, involve a
change in point of diversion or other change in water right as statutorily defined.
Change in water right is defined in the Colorado statutes as "a change in the type,
place, or time of use, a change in the point of diversion, a change from a fixed point
of diversion to alternate or supplemental points of diversion, a change from alternate
or supplemental points of diversion to a fixed point of diversion, a change in the
means of diversion, a change in the place of storage ... or any combination of such
changes." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (1997).
5. 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988).
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I.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF TRANSFERS UNDER COLORADO WATER

. LAW
A.

Statutory Approach to Water Rights

Colorado has been committed to the prior appropriation
doctrine in the administration of its water rights since 1864.6
Under this system, briefly described by the phrase "first in time,
first in right," water rights are prioritized by the chronological
order in which they were created, with the earliest (most "senior")
right receiving the highest priority. In times of shortage, an
earlier appropriation receives its entire water entitlement before
a later, more "junior" right receives any. An appropriation is
achieved by completing the following steps: forming an intent to
apply water to a beneficial use,' making a diversion,' and then
actually applying the water to the use without waste.9 After such
application the appropriator can receive a judicially awarded final
decree, with a priority backdated to the time the "first step" wastaken provided that the work toward appropriation continued
with reasonable diligence.10 The holder of the decree has a vested
right. 1
Prior to application of the water, a potential appropriator can
receive a conditional decree from the courts." Under a conditional decree, the appropriator's right is not finally adjudicated,
but the priority of the right is preserved. Holders of conditional
rights must make periodic showings of reasonable diligence in the
prosecution of their appropriations.' 3 This form of decree is
particularly desirable in the case of large water supply projects

6. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) ('The territorial
legislature in 1864 expressly recognizes the doctrine [of prior appropriation]. It says:
'Nor shall the water of any stream be diverted from its original channel to the
detriment of any miner, millmen or others along the line of said stream, who may
have a priority of right ....) (quoting 1864 Colo. Sess. Laws § 32) (emphasis added).
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1997).
8. See id. § 37-92-103(7).
9. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
10. The courts have defined reasonable diligence as that consistent with
community standards, for example, "that constancy or steadiness of purpose or labor
which is usual with men engaged in like enterprises ....
" Ophir Silver Mining Co.
v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 546 (1869).
11. And the holder is thus eligible for the protections described infra in text
accompanying notes 105-10.
12. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1997).
13. See id. § 37-92-301(4)(a).
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with lengthy construction schedules, because it protects the
priority of the right during the development stage and thereby
makes it easier to quantify projected returns on an investment.
In 1969, Colorado's appropriation doctrine underwent
considerable fine tuning with the passage of the Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act.14 The Act reorganized
judicial jurisdiction over water rights along watershed lines,
created a system of water courts, 15 regularized procedures for
obtaining decrees, 6 and expanded the state engineer's involvement in the process of establishing and administering water
rights. 7 In addition, the Act articulated new policies to encourage maximum utilization of the state's scarce water resources. 8
Under the 1969 Act, the use of the conditional decree has become
more widespread than it previously had been.
The process of utilizing a water right can well be described by
using an example of water decreed for irrigation purposes. The
appropriator diverts the water from its source by a headgate or
well, applies it to the crops by a variety of irrigation techniques,
and the water not consumed 9 in the process returns to the
source, either by seepage or through a "tailditch" designed for this
purpose. This "difference between the actual amount of water
applied to a beneficial use and the amount of return flow"2 is
"consumptive" or "historical" use.2' Uider the prior appropriation
doctrine the measurement of both total application and consumptive use of water by an appropriator is critical. This is especially
true at the time of a proposed transfer or other change in water
use.

Measuring the amount of water historically applied under a
water right is important because of the widely recognized
principle that application to a beneficial use is both the measure
and the limit of the right, regardless of the amount stated in a

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
through

See id. §§ 37-92-101 to -602.
See id. § 37-92-203.
See, e.g., id. § 37-92-305.
See, e.g., id. §§ 37-92-302(1)(a)-(b), -304(3), -401.
See, e.g., id. § 37-92-103(9).
Water is consumed through crop transpiration or evapo-transpiration, or
evaporation losses in the process of transporting the water or applying it to

the crops.
20. In re Steffens, 756 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Colo. 1988); see also Weibert v. Rothe
Bros., 618 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Colo. 1980); Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo. 1954).
21. See Ste/fens, 756 P.2d at 1005.
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paper decree.2 2 Thus, if an irrigator has a decree granting the
right to divert sixteen cubic feet per second ("cfs"), but has never
taken more than eight cfs from the stream, on an application for
transfer, that right will be reduced to eight cfs, the amount
historically applied to a beneficial use.2" Moreover, the eight cfs
remaining may be further reduced as explained below.2 4
B.

Change Decrees

The need for measurement of historical consumptive use
stems from the protection accorded to other vested water rights
on the occasion of a transfer or other "change" in water right.26
The practical effect of the protective rule is that when an
appropriator applies for a change in water right, holders of other
vested water rights are entitled to the maintenance of stream
conditions as they found them when they first made their
appropriations." In Colorado, this rule is codified: "A change of
water right or plan for augmentation, including water exchange
project, shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a
vested water right or a decreed conditional water right. '27 This
protection is usually thought of as applying primarily to junior
appropriators, but it may also be utilized to protect seniors. For
example, although a senior could customarily protect his or her
right by asserting the ranking priority through a "call" on the

22. See Romeniecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo.
1981); Weibert, 618 P.2d at 1372; Crawford Clipper Ditch Co. v. Needle Rock Ditch
Co., 114 P. 655, 657 (Colo. 1911); Drach v. Isola 109 P. 748, 751 (Colo. 1910); ELWOOD
MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 67 (1903).
23. See Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 782 (Colo. 1962); see also
Romeniecki, 633 P.2d at 1067.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. For the statutory definition of change in water right, see COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-103(5) (1997).
26. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo.
1988); City of Westminister v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58-59 (Colo. 1968); Enlarged

Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. Johns Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d 552, 554-55 (Colo.
1947).
27. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1997). A '"plan for augmentation' means
a detailed program ... to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use in

a division or portion thereof by the development of new or alternate means or points
of diversion, by a pooling of. water resources, by water exchange projects, by
providing substitute supplies of water, by the development of new sources of water,
or by any other appropriate means." Id. § 37-92-103(9).
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river, a senior's location on the stream or on tributaries may
render the call ineffectual.2"
The effect of the statutory provision is that the change must
be accompanied by protective conditions that will keep vested
rights whole.29 In fact, the statute requires the applicant to
provide the court with a proposed ruling that will eliminate any
such injury. If the applicant's proposed ruling falls short in this
respect, the statute allows those objecting to the transfer to
propose their own protective terms and conditions for the court's
consideration."0 The statute also instructs that such terms and
conditions "may include" the following:
(a) A limitation on the use of the water which is subject to the
change, taking into consideration the historic use and the
flexibility required by annual climatic differences;
(b) The relinquishment of part of the decree for which the
change is sought or the relinquishment of other decrees owned
by the applicant which are used-by the applicant in conjunction with the decree for which the change has been requested,
if necessary to prevent an enlargement upon the historic use
or diminution of return flow to the detriment of other appropriators;
(c) A time limitation on the diversion of water for which the
change is sought in terms of months per year;
(d) Such other conditions as may be necessary to protect the
vested rights of others.31
To explain the nuances of the process of protecting vested
water rights in Colorado on the occasion of a change, it will be

28. The protection of other appropriators in transfer situations has been
criticized on the grounds, among others, that it introduces uncertainty, increases
transaction costs, and impedes the operation of the market in water rights. See
JOSEPH SAX, WATER LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 207 (1965). The implementation
of the rule is criticized in Timothy D. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado:Fear and
Loathing of the Marketplace, in WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 119, 125-26.
29. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d
629, 632 (Colo. 1954); City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (Colo.
1952).
30. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1997).
31. Id. § 37-92-305(4). Such conditions might well include preventing a senior
from diverting, to the injury of juniors, at a different season when less water is in the
stream.
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necessary to provide a description of the nature of the state's
early water decrees." For better or for worse, virtually all the
early direct flow right3 3 and change decrees were stated only in
terms of flow rate, expressed as cubic feet per second, with no
limitation on total volume.34 The appropriator would emerge
from the judicial adjudication with a decree indicating a priority
date, a location for the headgate or other diversion structure, a
description of the right (irrigation, for example), a rate of flow
and, in the case of irrigation rights, a description of the lands
intended to be served by the appropriation.35 Volumetric limitations36 seldom were established. When and if, at some future
time, the actual amount of water utilized under a decree needed
to be established, it was necessary to examine the records of the
State Engineer, or to take extrinsic evidence to determine this
amount. With flow rates and the length of time the headgate was
opened in hand, a calculation could then be made of the volumetric quantity of water diverted.
Whatever the process of determining actual water use
associated with early decrees, it is essential to draw a distinction
between amounts diverted for application to a beneficial use, and
amounts consumed in the process. While the amount diverted
can be established in Colorado by reference to the records of the
State Engineer indicating when, for how long, and at what rate
of flow headgates were opened or wells pumped, consumptive use
may be more difficult to ascertain. Determining historical
consumption of water in a given case raises technical and
evidentiary problems, and is far from an exact science.3

32. For a general discussion of the definition of water rights under the
appropriation system, see George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party
Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 5-12 (1988).
33. Under a direct flow right, water is diverted from the source and applied
immediately to its beneficial use. By contrast, under a storage right, water is
impounded and held in a reservoir for later application.
34. A cubic foot per second is a rate of water flow through a flume one foot on

a side, moving at one foot per second.
35. See Gould, supra note 32, at 5-12.
36. Volumetric limitations are normally defined in acre feet. An acre foot is the
amount of water needed to cover an acre of land one foot deep. The volume is the
amount of water produced by a given flow rate multiplied by a length of time (rate
x time = volume). For example, water flowing at a rate of three cubic feet per second
("cfs") for 24 hours would produce approximately six acre feet of water. Three cfs is

the flow rate, whereas six acre feet is the volume.
37.

See generally discussion infra Part III.A.
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The importance of measuring historical consumption has
increased substantially as water right changes and transfers have
become the dominant method of meeting new water needs. Most
of the accessible watercourses in Colorado have already been
heavily appropriated. New appropriations with junior priority
dates are not dependable because they are unlikely to be satisfied, particularly in years of below average streamflow. Dependable water supplies for new or expanded uses can normally be
acquired only by purchasing existing senior rights, most of which
are currently used for agricultural purposes. Therefore the
typical means of acquiring water today is to purchase an existing
water right and apply for a change, including a new point of
diversion and a change in use from agricultural to municipal or
other uses.
C. Limitations Imposed in Connection with Change
Decrees
When a change in water right 'is sought, Colorado law
constrains the change in order to protect vested rights. There are
at least four limitations which may be imposed on the water right
being transferred. The first three deal with historical use of the
water right, even in the absence of direct injury to another user
at the time of the transfer. The fourth, which I will discuss in
detail, directly addresses the problem of protecting other vested
rights.
Reduction of the decreed amount because it exceeds the
historic beneficial use of the appropriator. Beneficial use is the
limit and measure of a water right, regardless of the amount set
in the decree." As noted above, 9 water which has never been
applied to a beneficial use has not ripened into an appropriation,
and therefore is not available for transfer.40 Normally, this
reduction would be accomplished by lowering the diversionary
flow rate assigned to the transferred right.
Reduction of the transferredright to reflect abandonment. A
change application proceeding is an appropriate occasion for a

38.
39.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text, and supra note 22.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.

40. The Colorado Supreme Court has distinguished this from an abandonment.
See Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 782-83 (Colo. 1962).
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declaration of abandonment under Colorado law.41 In Colorado,
abandonment requires a concurrence of non-use and intent to
abandon.42 When these elements are established, the court can
declare either all or a portion of the applicant's water right
abandoned. To the extent abandoned, a right will not be available for transfer. Again, the reduction is likely to be framed in
terms of rate of flow.
Reduction of the transferredright because its applicationhas
exceeded the "duty of water" with respect to the decreed place of
use. The Colorado Supreme Court has defined duty of water as:
that measure of water, which, by careful management and
use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to
any given tract of land for such period of time as may be
adequate to produce therefrom a maximum amount of such
crops as ordinarily are grown thereon. It is not a hard and
fast unit of measurement, but is variable according to conditions.4"
Reduction of the transferred right to the extent necessary to
protect other vested water rights. This category of limitation
follows directly from the statutory mandate to avoid injury to
other rights.44 While the previous three actions have justifications in water law independent of the protection of vested rights,45
reductions to protect vested rights are designed to accomplish
exactly that end. This strongly suggests that if a particular
change application will not injure the vested rights of others, no
limitation on the transferred right is necessary.
Of course, one must look at the entire spectrum of potential
injury involved in any change application.4" For instance, a

41. See People v. City of Thornton, 775 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1989); Masters Inv. Co.
v. Irrigationists Ass'n, 702 P.2d 268 (Colo. 1985); In re CF&I Steel Corp. v.
Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 515 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1973).
42. For a thorough description of the concept of abandonment, see City of
Thornton, 775 P.2d at 17-19.
43. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
634 (Colo. 1954). As so defined, the concept differs from beneficial use, which
describes categories of water use. Duty of water, by contrast, is the amount required
to achieve the beneficial use.
44. See discussion of the rule and its operation supra text accompan-ing notes
25-27.
45. Abandoriment, for instance, has as its purpose leaving unused water in the
stream rather than protecting existing rights.
46. See generally Gould, supranote 32, at 13-18. Professor Gould summarizes
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particular change in the point of diversion may work no injuries
to other users, while a subsequent change of use may lead to an
enlargement of the amount consumed and consequent injury to
downstream users who rely on historical return flows from the
previous upstream use. It is also true that an increase in the
time frame during which a right is exercised might enlarge the
consumptive use to the injury of others. Diversion year-round, 'for
municipal or industrial purposes, of an irrigation right historically used only during the irrigation season would very likely
injure others. Failure to consider all potential sources of injury
inevitably leads to change decrees containing inadequate terms.
These problems often surface when the same water right is the
subject of a subsequent change application.4 7
When such potential injury is detected,4" at least four types
of conditions can be imposed to effectuate the fourth limitation
and avoid injury. One is to require the applicant to provide a
substitute supply of water. This can be accomplished either
through some sort of exchange arrangement or, since the enactment of the 1969 Water Right Determination and Administration
Act,49 through a plan for augmentation." Allowing a user to
remedy the injury by use of substitute water provides some
flexibility to maximize the utilization of the state's water re51
sources.

Second, the rate of flow authorized by the original decree may
be reduced, and the transferee required to relinquish a portion of
the original flow to the stream. This appears to be the standard

the areas of potential injury as reduced return flows, transfers of seasonal water
rights, stream conveyance losses, changes in the point of diversion, and temporary
storage problems, a phenomenon associated with the timing of return flows. See id.
47. See discussion of implied limitations infra Part II.B.; see also City of
Westminister v. Church, 445 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1968).
48. Injury is detected either because the applicant fails to show no injury or the
opponents prove injury.
49. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (Supp. 1969).
50. See id. § 37-92-103(9). The current statute requires a plan for augmentation if an application for a conditional decree anticipates out-of-priority

diversions. See id. § 37-92-305(3).
51. See Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d
288 (Colo. 1976).
52. This is commonly referred to in the cases as "abandoning" a portion of the
water right to the stream. The usage is unfortunate, confusing common-law

abandonment with an entirely different phenomenon.

For a discussion of

common-law abandonment, see People v. City of Thornton, 775 P.2d 11, 17-19 (Colo.
1989).
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method of protecting vested rights from the late 1800s to the
early 1970s. The classic formulation is that the water right is
reduced to its historic consumptive use (even though stated in
terms of flow rate), if necessary to protect the vested rights of
others.5 3 The options presumably would range from no reduction
to a reduction down to the historic consumptive use, depending on
the potential of injury to other users. This method continues to
be permitted under the Colorado statutes, 5 4 however the process
raises fundamental equity issues which will be discussed below. 5
During the years immediately following the passage of the
1969 Act,56 pressed by the onset of plans for augmentation and
assisted by improved engineering techniques, the courts began to
utilize a third method of conditioning change decrees to protect
vested rights: translation of the historical consumptive use into
a volumetric amount. The courts would then limit the amount of
water transferred to whatever volume was necessary to protect
vested rights. But in no event would the volume allowed to be
transferred be less than the number of acre feet historically
consumed. This has the advantage of addressing part of the
problem of time constraints mentioned above.57 Decrees employing this approach have also usually limited the transferee to the
original decreed flow rate, as long as actual historic diversions
were not less than the decreed amount.
Finally, the time constraint problem can be addressed
directly by simply limiting the transferee to the same timing of
diversions used by the transferor. Thus a water right historically
used during particular months of the year would be limited to
that pattern in the hands of the transferee.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED LIMITATIONS

Unfortunately, it has become apparent that the courts have
not always fashioned change decrees that fully protect the vested
rights of others, even though they may have thought they were
doing so. A 1995 report by a Colorado water consulting firm
53. See Willis H. Ellis, Water TransferProblems: Law, in WATER RESEARCH 233,
244-48 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds., 1965).
54. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4)(a), (d) (1997).
55. See generally infra Part III.
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1997).
57. However part of the timing problem remains: if acre feet formerly utilized
during the irrigation season are switched to winter, there may still be injury.
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studied 919 of the 1,053 pre-1969 transfer decrees filed with the
Colorado State Engineer.5" None of the 919 decrees contained a
volumetric limit on the water rights after the transfer.5 9 Eight
hundred fourteen had no flow rate limits, 906 no seasonal limits,
and 810 neither flow rate nor seasonal limits.6" The study also
examined some of these decrees in greater detail and concluded
that, in cases where irrigation rights were transferred to municipal purposes, it was common for water use thereafter to expand
significantly."'
Neither the low number of express limitations nor the
subsequent expansion of use is surprising. Given the statutory
mandate that conditions and limitations be imposed if
necessary to protect vested rights, it appears that many of these
transfer decrees were issued under the assumption (either
expressed or unstated) that the proposed change in water right
would not work an injury and that therefore no conditions
were required. As a practical matter, these early decrees reflect
a time when there were fewer appropriations and less demand on
the state's streams, no doubt resulting in fewer objectors in a
given proceeding, and less pressure for extensive terms and
conditions.
Another possible explanation for the absence of limitations is
that some of the injury inquiries were too limited in scope. Where
a court considered an application for a change in point of diversion, it may have accurately concluded that such a change would
not injure vested rights in the case at hand, or that the injury
could be avoided by requiring the transferee to relinquish some
portion of the decreed flow rate to the stream. However, when
the transferee subsequently changed the type of use or expanded
the time of diversion, unanticipated injury to vested rights may
have occurred.
Moreover, in many circumstances an early water right may
have subsequently been expanded without benefit of any judicial
review. Prior to 1969, the Colorado statutes required judicial
action only in cases where a change in the point of diversion was
contemplated. If a new use or other change could be supplied

58. See JOE TOM WOOD, HAPPY BIRTHDAY, ORR 15-16 (Martin and Wood Water
Consultants, Inc. ed., 1995).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.

COLORADO WATER LAW

1998]

from the historic point of diversion, no judicial review or decree
was necessary.
A.

2

Implied Limitations and the Orr Doctrine

A Pandora's box opens when a previously changed water
right later becomes the subject of an application for further
change. The earlier change decree may lack express limitations,
or contain limitations that are inadequate. The original water
right may have been subjected to a change without benefit of a
decree. In each of these situations, when fashioning the new
decree, the court is faced with two sets of historical water uses:
those associated with the original decree and the potentially
expanded uses after the initial transfer. This dilemma has led to
the doctrine of implied limitations.
The leading case dealing with implied limitations is Orr v.
Arapahoe Water & Sanitation District.63 In Orr, the court held
that a change in use is limited in amount to the historical
consumptive use at the original decreed point of diversion. 4 The
water rights at issue in Orr originated as four decreed surface
irrigation rights out of Cherry Creek, near Denver, with priority
dates ranging from 1862 to 1885.65 No express acre foot limitations were imposed in the original decree. 66 Until the mid-1930s,
these rights were used to irrigate lands that would eventually
become the Diamond Over D Ranch. A flood at that time
destroyed the headgates and portions of the ditches by which
these rights had been diverted.67 The headgates were never
replaced, and irrigation of the land ceased for an extended period
of time. In 1950, the Diamond Over D Ranch was purchased,
along with the four water rights, by a family named Dixon."8 In

62.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-9-22 (1963).

Most transfers would in fact

contemplate a change in the point of diversion, so a decree would have been required.
In the context of the judicial hearing, other possible sources of injury would be
pertinent. Expansions of use, whether or not accompanied by a change in the point
of diversion, were apparently common before 1969. See generally WOOD, supra note
58.
63. 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988). The doctrine of implied limitations is
sometimes referred to as the "Orr doctrine."
64. See id. at 1223-24.
65. See id. at 1219.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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1953, the Dixons transferred title to the ranch and water rights
to a family-held ranching and feedlot corporation.69 By 1963, the
corporation had drilled seven irrigation wells through which it
pumped irrigation water as a substitute for the surface water
utilized under the original four surface ditch decrees.7 ° The
pumped water was tributary ground water coming from essentially the same source as the surface water.
In 1969, the corporation petitioned to have the change in
points of diversion from the ditches to the wells formally adjudicated.7" The vice president of the corporation testified that
"subsequent to the drilling of the wells the Dixon family had used
the wells to divert water pursuant to the water rights
originally decreed to the ditches, and had done so continuously
and without objection from other water users."72 A water
engineer also testified that the change in the point of diversion would not adversely affect any other appropriators. 3
However, "[n]o evidence was presented at the 1969 hearing
concerning the amount of land actually irrigated or the amount
of water consumptively used in irrigating the land either
through the ditches or the wells."74 The trial court found that a
decree changing the point of diversion would not injure the vested
water rights of other users and granted the decree, concluding
that
[Diamond Over D Ranch, Inc.], its successors and assigns as
owners of the modified water rights may, in the exercise of any
one or combination of two or more of said rights, divert water
from the underflow of Cherry Creek at any single or a combination of two or more of the new, alternate points of diversion,
provided that diversions under the priorities of said rights,
shall not exceed the total amount of the Petitioner'sinterest in
the Decrees as modified.75
In 1972, the corporation was dissolved and the land and
water rights reconveyed to the Dixons, who in 1979 transferred

69. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1219.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1219-20.
73. See id. at 1220.
74. Id.
75. Orr, 753 P.2d at 1220 (quoting the 1969 decree issued by the district court)
(emphasis added).
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them to a water and sewage district as part of a real estate
development plan.7 6 In 1981, the district and other parties
involved in the development petitioned the Division 1 Water
Court for a decree to change the seven irrigation wells from
irrigation to municipal use. Several parties, including the State
Engineer, filed statements of opposition.7 7
At a hearing before a water referee,78 the petitioners asserted
that the 1969 decree confirmed the extent of irrigation practiced
from 1956 to 1979 by the Dixons and Diamond Over D Ranch:
specifically, 310 acres of land used for a feedlot operation, with an
annual consumptive use of 682 acre feet from the seven wells.79
The objectors contended that the transfer to the wells was limited
by the 1969 decree to no more than the amount of water consumptively used by the ditches when they were in operation, which the
referee found to be 282.8 acre feet per year.80 Relying on the
language quoted above from the 1969 decree 1 and noting that the
petitioners held a half-interest in the water rights, the referee
ruled that the change to municipal use would entitle the water
and sewage district to withdraw only 141 acre feet of water
annually from the wells for municipal purposes, with the original
ditch priority dates. 2
The petitioners filed a protest to the referee's ruling, reiterating their view that the 1969 decree authorized a consumptive use
of 682 acre feet per year from the wells, and arguing moreover
that the 1969 decree was res judicata as to their right to this
amount.8 3 After a hearing on the protest, the water court
affirmed the referee's ruling, interpreting the "ambiguous" 1969
decree as limiting the ranch to the historic uses under the surface
decrees rather than to "what appears to be a somewhat expanded
use" during the period of well pumping. 4

76. See id.
77. See id. at 1220 n.3.
78. The water judge in each water division is authorized to appoint one or more
referees to assist the judge. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203(4)-(6) (1997).
79. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1221.
80. See id.
81. See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
82. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1221. The discrepancy in the amount of water
ultimately decreed is due to the absence of evidence; no consumptive use was
attributed to one of the four ditches.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1222 (quoting the 1986 decree issued by the water court).
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On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court took the opportunity
to review the law regarding changes in water rights, including, by
definition, changes in points of diversion.8" It noted the statutory
provision that an appropriator may apply for a change in water
right, and that such changes require the applicant to prove that
the change will not injure the vested rights of other water users,
86
especially junior appropriators.
The court further observed that in order to provide such
protection, "several limitations are read into every decree by
implication."8 Such limitations include the following: diversions
are limited to an amount sufficient for the appropriation's
purpose; no more water can be diverted than can be used
beneficially; diversions may not be extended in time to irrigate
new lands; and a senior appropriator may not take excess water,
left over after the irrigation process, and lend, rent, or sell it to
others as against a junior.88
Specifically addressing changes in the point of diversion, the
court held that to protect junior appropriators such changes are
"limited in quantity by historical use at the original decreed
point of diversion" 9 and that they are limited by "the duty of
water with respect to the original decreed place of use."9 ° The
result, according to the court, is that a senior may not
"enlarge the historical use of a water right by changing the point
of diversion and then diverting . . . the full amount" of the
original decree. This is true even if the historical use at the
original point of diversion was less than the decreed diversion
rate. 91

The court then applied these "long standing principles of
Colorado water law"92 to sustain the water court's limitation of
the applicants to 141 acre feet per year for municipal purposes.9"
It reasoned:

85. See id. at 1222-23.
86. See id. at 1223; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (1997).
87. Orr, 753 P.2d at 1223.
88. See id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 1223 n.5. For an explanation of "duty of water," see supranote 43 and
accompanying text.
91. See id. at 1224.
92. Id.
93. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1225.
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The 1969 decree changing the points of diversion limited the
amount of water that could be diverted through the seven
wells, the new points of diversion, to that same amount
historically diverted through the four ditches, the original
decreed points of diversion.... The fact that the 1969 decree
did not expressly limit the well diversions to the amount of
water historically diverted through the ditches is not controlling, since such a limitation is read into every water decree by
implication.9 4
Turning to the issue of the res judicata effect of the 1969
decree, the court held that the doctrine was inapplicable to this
case. The court ruled that the implied limitation on the well
diversions contained in the 1969 decree, and the fact that no
evidence was taken in the 1969 proceeding as to historical water
use, permitted the water court subsequently to consider the
extent of use. 95
The application of res judicata to Colorado water decrees has
recently been revisited in Williams v. Midway Ranches Property
Owners Ass'n.9" The case involved a situation substantially
different from Orr, but the differences help to illustrate Orr's
treatment of the doctrine. In Midway Ranches, the applicant
sought approval of a plan for augmentation to replace tributary
water which would be removed by proposed well diversions. The
plan contemplated the utilization of shares of the Fountain Valley
Mutual Irrigation Company ("FMIC") as the source of replacement water.9 7 In contrast to Orr, the consumptive use figures had
already been litigated. In previous determinations the water
court had found that each FMIC share yielded 0.7 acre foot of net
average consumptive use for replacement purposes per year based
on historic use of the mutual ditch company's water rights. 9 8
Under these circumstances, the supreme court concluded that
"the water court was correct in applying res judicata to prevent
relitigation of the historic use determinations made by previous
water court judgments and decrees regarding the FMIC water
rights."99
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
record

Id. at 1224 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1225-26.
938 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1997).
See id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 521. Interestingly, the court also concluded that "evidence in the
supports the water court's finding that the 0.7 acre foot yield
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Analysis of Orr in the Context of Colorado Water Law

Orr appears to be a case where the focus of the first (1969)
change application was on the impact of changing the point of
diversion from headgates to wells, excluding other possible
sources of injury. It aptly illustrates the importance of distinguishing between water applied to a beneficial use and water
actually consumed by that application. The trial court in the
1969 hearing made an express finding that a change in the point
of diversion from ditches to wells would not injure the vested
rights of others, as the modified points of diversion "will result in
no change in the place or type of use of water [and] the rights will
continue to be used for the irrigation of lands of the Petitioner
which have been historically irrigated by use of said rights."100
However, as the Colorado Supreme Court pointed out, "[n]o
evidence was presented at the 1969 hearing concerning the
amount of land actually irrigated or the amount of water consumptively used in irrigating the land either through the ditches
or the wells."' 01'
The key inquiry for the subsequent change is the nature of
"Petitioner's interest" under the original decrees and how such
interest should be measured. The referee, water court, and
supreme court in 1981 concentrated on the water consumed in the
irrigation operation, first under the original ditch diversions and
then under the wells. The 1969 court apparently assumed, sub
silentio, that these consumptive amounts would be the same, and
then concluded that no injury would occur to other rights. But
the consumptive use was not to be the sam . Consumption under
the wells was significantly greater, as we have seen, than under

calculation continued to apply under arguably changed conditions occurring
between [the date of the prior decree] and the trial of this case." Id. A water
engineer had so testified. See id. at 520. An important unresolved question
is what the effect would have been had testimony indicated that the earlier yield
calculation was no longer correct. The Water Court in Water Division I has recently
applied the rule in Midway Ranches to give res judicata effect to a prior change
decree. See Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, No. 95 CW 205
(Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo., Aug. 5, 1997) (order dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint).
100. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Colo.
1988) (quoting the trial court in the 1969 hearing); see also supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
101. Id.
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the ditches. 10 2 The reason is that after the wells began pumping,
the irrigated acreage was increased from 240 to over 310,103 with
a consequent enlargement in the amount of water consumed in
the irrigation operation.0 14 Because the enlarged use was not
anticipated by the 1969 court, the supreme court in 1988 took the
opportunity to retroactively impose limitations on the 1969
transfer. The scope and rationale of those limitations warrant
attention.
After reciting the statutory opportunity to apply for a change
in water right, and the accompanying duty to protect vested
identified the following "implied" limitations
rights, the Orr court
1 05
in every decree:
1. Diversions are limited to an amount sufficient for the
appropriation, even though less than the
purposes of the
06
decreed rate;1
2. An appropriator cannot, as against a junior, divert more
water than can be used beneficially; 1 7
3. A senior may not, as against a junior, "lend, rent, or sell
any excess water after completing the irrigation of the land for
which the water was appropriated[;]"'0 °
4. An appropriator, again as against a junior, cannot "extend
the time of diversion to irrigate lands other than those for
which the appropriation was made[;J"' 10 9
5. "The right to change a point of diversion is limited in
quantity by historical use at the original decreed point of
diversion.""'

102. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
103. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 16, App. II, Orr v. Arapahoe Water &
Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988) (No. 86SA132); see also Brief of
Appellees at 2, Orr (No. 86SA132).
104. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1220.
105. These limitations, and the rationales behind them, were recently

reiterated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Williams v. Midway Ranches Property
Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 521-34 (Colo. 1997).

106. See Orr, 753 P.2d at 1223.
107. See id.

108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Romeniecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064 (Colo.
1981)).
110. Orr, 753 P.2d at 1223.
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The first implied limitation recognizes the concept of "duty of
water" as established in Colorado water law.11 ' The second and
third limitations are expressions of the familiar rule that
beneficial use is the measure and limit of a water right under the
prior appropriation doctrine." 2 Many of the early Colorado
decrees awarded rates of flow in excess of the amounts needed for
the claimant's beneficial use, even to the extent of granting more
water than a particular ditch would carry." 3 The Colorado courts
have utilized the beneficial use limitation to attack these
excessive paper -rights and leave water in the stream to be
appropriated anew.
The fourth limitation, dealing with extensions of the time of
diversion to irrigate new lands, is more problematic. This
limitation is qualified by the phrase "as against a junior
appropriator." If the court means as against an injured junior
appropriator, its validity is clear. Since 1969, a change in the
14
time of diversion has been defined as a "change of water right,""
and all such time changes are subject to an injunction against
injury to vested rights." 5 However, if the court means to apply
this limitation against any junior appropriator, injured or not, it
runs counter to the letter of the statute, which is aimed at
protecting vested rights from injury, and appears to grant an
applicant a right to a change in the absence of injury." 6
The fourth limitation is further qualified by the language "to
irrigate lands other than those for which the appropriation was
made.""' 7 If avoidance of injury is the goal, this limitation should
equally apply to diversions expanded in time to increase irrigation of the original lands. The irrigation of new lands would not
in itself appear to be a problem. The scope of the appurtenance
doctrine, tying water use to particular land in some western
states, 8 has been narrowly limited in Colorado and is utilized
111. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d
629, 634 (Colo. 1954); supra text accompanying note 43.
112. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
113. See generally MEAD, supra note 22, at chapter 8.
114. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (1997).
115. See id. § 37-92-305(3).
116. See id.
117. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo.
1988) (quoting Romeniecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1981)).
118. See George A. Gould, Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to Industrial
Uses, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791, 1803-06 (1982); 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 454-66 (1971).
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primarily to determine whether water rights passed with land
under a conveyance." 9 The right to use water on other lands, in
the absence of injury to other vested rights, has been a feature of
Colorado water law since early times.12 °
The fifth implied limitation enunciated by the court restricts
the quantity that may be transferred in a change of point of
diversion to the "historical use at the original point of
diversion."'' This limitation is explained as an application of the
junior protection rule,'22 giving juniors vested rights in the
continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of
the juniors' appropriations.' 2 3 As a result, explains the court, a
senior appropriator is not entitled to enlarge the historical use of
a water right by changing the point of diversion and then
diverting from the new location the full amount of water decreed
to the original point of diversion, even though the historical use
at the original point of diversion might have been less than the
decreed rate of diversion.'2 4
If historical use means what the Colorado Supreme Court has
said it means, namely consumptive use,'2 5 it is difficult to rationalize this limitation. With rare exceptions, 26 all consumptive
uses will be less than the decreed rate of diversion. Taken literally, the limitation would reduce the amount of water to be diverted from the decreed amount to the amount of consumptive

119. See generally 1 GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW § 6.1, at 599-609
(1987).
120. See, e.g., Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 26 P.2d 102 (1933);
Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 19 P. 836 (1888).
121. Orr, 753 P.2d at 1224. The court also states that
[tihe right to change a point of diversion is also limited in quantity to the
duty of water with respect to the original decreed place of use .... The
historical use of a water right could very well be less than the duty of water
if, for example, it was physically impossible in the past to divert water at the
optimum rate on a continuing basis.
Id. at 1223-24 n.5.
122. See id. at 1223-24.
123. See id; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
124. Orr, 753 P.2d. at 1224 (emphasis added).
125. See In re Steffens, 756 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Colo. 1988).
126. An example of a diversion which would effectively be totally consumptive
is the transmountain diversion. There, no water returns to the watershed of
origin. In fact, once such water is diverted into the new basin, there are no
protectable rights to its return flow even in the new basin, as the
appropriator who brought it there may make successive use and reuse of the foreign
water. See City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144
(Colo. 1972).
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use each time there was a transfer, whether or not such a
reduction was necessary to eliminate injury. Such a remedy penalizes an appropriator for merely changing the point of diversion, and is rarely necessary. One can readily posit a situation
where the point of diversion could be changed ad infinitum
without working any injury to other users, so long as the amount
consumed does not increase and the return flow gets back at the
right time and place on the stream to benefit downstream juniors.
If the goal is to limit the diversion after the change to the
same amount diverted before the change, the necessity for such
a rule depends directly on the potential for injury, based on the
difference in consumption. Sometimes the new use is less
consumptive than the old. In such a case there is no reason to
prohibit the new user from diverting at a greater rate than the
old, unless such an increase would result in injury to vested
rights directly attributable to the change in the rate of diversion.
III.

THE MEASUREMENT OF WATER RIGHTS AND OPTIMAL USE

A.

The Hydrologic Problem

Another problem in transferring water rights, already alluded to above, stems from the methods used to physically
quantify the amount of water that can be transferred. The
measurement of water use in the field presents significant
Diversions themselves, whether from
technical problems.
headgates or wells, can be accurately measured, and reference to
the records of the water commissioners and of the State Engineer
will sometimes provide a good account of when and in what
amounts water has been applied. Where records are missing or
incomplete, witness testimony or other sources'2 7 can be consulted
to fill in the gaps. Where irrigation has taken place over a period
of years, these numbers will often vary from year to year. For
example, in dry years, when soil moisture levels are low and there
is little precipitation during the growing season, demand for
irrigation water will be very high; senior irrigators will likely
divert water up to the full limits of their decreed rights, even if
they had been diverting less water in wetter years. Irrigators
127. For instance, aerial photographs taken by the Soil Conservation Service
may provide evidence of past irrigation practices. Pumping rates may be revealed
by an examination of electrical bills.
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with junior rights may find their water rights unsatisfied, at least
in part, due to both the greater depletions by senior users and
their own increased need for water. Thus, variations in water
supply and demand for beneficial use lead to fluctuating water
use from year to year.
The common method of accommodating these fluctuations is
to average water application by an irrigator over the years. This
approach makes important the timing of an irrigator's application
for a change of water right. If such an application immediately
follows a series of dry years, average water uses will be correspondingly high. Wet years will lower the average, to the disadvantage of the applicant. Uncertain about preserving the whole
water right, farmers, schooled in the western water tradition of
"use it or lose it," tend to apply the full decreed amount whether
needed or not. Such a standard is inconsistent with Colorado's
desire to achieve optimum use of the state's scarce water re8
sources.12
Determination of consumptive use may well be of greater
interest from the perspective of the junior appropriator. Even
this proposition has been challenged. Professor George Gould has
argued that defining water rights in terms of diversionary flow
rights better serves the protection of junior appropriators, and
that, by contrast, volumetric definition of water rights has serious
limitations.12 9 Regardless of the outcome of this debate, Colorado
has been firmly committed to the use of volumetric limitations in
over-appropriated basins since the passage of the 1969 Water
Right Determination and Administration Act. In the case of an
irrigation right, consumptive use can be derived from crop
demand, which in turn can be calculated by such methods as the
Blaney-Criddle1 3 ° or Penman-Monteith13 1 formulae. Subtracting

128. The optimum use doctrine was first enunciated in Fellhauerv. People, 447
P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968). See infra text accompanying notes 136-40.
129. See Gould, supra note 32, at 25-28.
130. The Blaney-Criddle formula utilizes mean monthly temperature, length
of day, available moisture, and other factors to estimate monthly consumptive water
requirements. For a detailed description, see Harry F. Blaney & Wayne D. Criddle,
Determining Water Requirementsfor Settling Water Disputes, 4 NAT. RESOURCES. J.
29 (1964).

131. The Penman-Monteith method operates on a shorter time 'scale than
Blaney-Criddle and is more data intensive. For an explanation, see JOHN L.
MONTEITH & M.H. UNSWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHYSICS 245-63 (2d
ed. 1990).
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crop demand and other evaporative losses from the amount of
water diverted will yield return flow to the stream.
It might appear that the maintenance of return flows would
be necessary to maintain stream conditions as they existed at the
time junior appropriators made their original appropriation. The
validity of such an assumption depends on the timing of return
flows and the location of downstream appropriators vis-a-vis
those returns.13 2 In some cases, water remaining after irrigation
is carried directly to the stream by a tail or waste ditch.' 33 More
commonly, irrigation return flows seep back to the stream as
diffused surface water 34 or enter a tributary alluvial groundwater
aquifer.135 In both events, the water is almost always moving
more slowly than it would be were it in the stream itself.
The typical irrigation right begins diverting in May and
continues through September or October, the so-called irrigation
season. During most of this period, because of delays in return
flow and evapo-transpiration from the crops, diversions will
significantly exceed returns. After diversions cease in the early
fall, return flow will continue with significant net recharge to the
stream occurring in late fall, winter, and early spring. These
delays in return flow mean that the practical impact of irrigation
season depletion is not necessarily the same as net annual
consumption. Arguably, to the extent that there is no winter call
on an appropriator's delayed return flow, a change decree should
credit that user with historic depletion rather than annual
average consumption.
Furthermore, the irrigation return flow that remains in, and
moves through the alluvial aquifer may not be physically
available to junior surface diverters immediately downstream of
the original diversion. Indeed, where the water right in question
is near the state border, it is likely that no Colorado appropriator
132. It is not always easy to determine the source of a water shortage
downstream. As a pair of economists has noted: "Due to spatial dispersion of
appropriators, informational inadequacies, and random elements, it is often difficult
to determine whether a diminished downstream flow to appropriators is the result
of the stochastic nature of river flows or of the actions of upstream appropriators."
Burness & Quirk, supra note 1, at 116.
133. For a discussion of the right to the continuance of such waste water, and
its distinction from irrigation return flows, see City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left
Hand Ditch Co., 557 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1976).
134. Diffused surface water is surface water not in a natural watercourse.
135. An alluvial aquifer is the groundwater-bearing formation directly
associated with the stream.
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would benefit from the maintenance of return flows. Protecting
vested rights by deriving return flows on an annualized basis
from applications and crop demands is far less sophisticated than
the task requires.
B. Maximum Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources
Transfer of water rights should also be evaluated in the
context of another important principle of Colorado water law: the
goal of "maximum utilization" or "optimum use." In 1968, in
3 6 the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated two
Fellhauerv. People,"
provisions of the Colorado Constitution: "The right to divert the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream shall never be
denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as
between those using the water for the same purpose."'3 7 Noting
that the parties in Fellhauerhad cited sixty Colorado cases, all
primarily concerned with the respective priorities of vested rights,
the court continued:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with
vested rights, there shall be maximum utilizationof the water

of this state. As administration of water approaches its second
century the curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilizationand how constitutionally that doctrine can be
integrated into the law of vested rights. We have known for a
long time that the doctrine was lurking in the backstage
shadows as a result of the accepted, though oft violated,
principle that the right to water does not give the right to
waste it. 138
In the following year, the Colorado Legislature codified the
goal "to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of this
state," 39 equating this with "the optimum use of water consistent
with preservation of the priority system of water rights.' 4 °

136. 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
137. COLO.CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
138. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (emphasis inoriginal).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (1997).
140. Id. § 37-92-501(2)(e). The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized the
legislative intent to equate maximum use with optimum use. See Alamosa-La Jara
Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983).
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Despite enthusiastic repetition of the optimum use
language, 4 ' the Colorado Supreme Court has been cautious in
implementing the concept, perhaps because of signals from the
legislature that vested rights are the primary concern. In
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Shelton
Farms,Inc.,'42 for instance, the court disapproved an imaginative
plan to augment Arkansas River water by removing waterconsuming salt cedar trees that had grown in the river bed. Two
concurring justices sensed a missed opportunity to save water,
and expressed a need for legislative intervention.'
The legislature did in fact respond, but not as the concurring justices had
hoped. Instead, it codified the majority approach by prohibiting
such a scheme from qualifying as a plan for augmentation.'
Perhaps the most ambitious application of the optimum use
doctrine appeared in Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Ass'n v.
Gould.'4 5 There, restrictions on water use along the Rio Grande
River in Colorado were required in order to provide additional
water to enable the state to meet its compact obligations to New
Mexico and Texas. The state engineer proposed shutting down
junior wells drawing from tributary groundwater in order to
maintain supplies for senior surface users. Disagreeing, the
Colorado Supreme Court observed that the goal of optimal water
utilization might require the seniors to construct wells of their
own to satisfy their appropriations, before requiring curtailment
of junior rights." This ruling represents a significant willingness
to rethink historic concepts of "vested" rights, in the interest of
better utilization of water resources.
One way of encouraging optimum use is to provide disincentives to wasting water, and incentives for socially desirable water47
use. Failure to reward salvage of water, as in Shelton Farms,

141. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. United States,
891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo. 1995); Simpson v. Yale Investments, Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 696
(Colo. 1994); City and County of Denver v. Consol. Ditches Co. of Dist. No. 2, 807
P.2d 23, 34 (Colo. 1991); Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View
Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976); Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1976).
142. 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974).
143. See id. at 1328.
144. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1997).
145. 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).
146. See id. at 935.
147. 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974).
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discourages innovative projects to increase water utilization. 148
Although the concept was arguably pushed to an extreme in
Shelton Farms, incentives should be provided for innovative
projects to increase water utilization. For example, few ditch
owners will line their ditches if the appropriators do not get to
keep any of the water saved. By the same token, the holder of a
water right who does not need the water at a given time should
be encouraged by the law to leave it in the stream for the benefit
of junior appropriators. When such good citizenship is subsequently penalized in the process of averaging annual diversions
for a change application, unsociable behavior is encouraged, the
use-it-or-lose-it philosophy prevails, and water is wasted.
CONCLUSIONS
Certainty of a water right has been one of the leading
attributes of the appropriation system since its inception. Indeed,
the stability and predictability of the appropriative right,
compared with the continuing saga of comparative reasonableness associated with the riparian system,'4 9 was a major factor in
the rejection of common-law riparianism by the early miners,
irrigators, and legislators in the West.'
In today's era of
growing water demands, the need for certainty of supply is
increased. This is particularly true of municipal water, where
growth in demand in Colorado has been greatest. Ready movement of water from agricultural to municipal use will require a
smoothly functioning transfer process which promotes an effective
market in water rights. Uncertainty about the quantities
available for transfer will only impede the development of such a
market.
The application of limitations on transferred rights, particularly implied, retroactive limitations such as those suggested by
Orr, impacts the market and should be approached with caution.
The Colorado statute authorizes the water court to maintain
jurisdiction over transfer decrees, after the transfer occurs, to
148. See supra notes 142-43. For a discussion of the inefficiencies and impact
on water marketing of such practices, see Tregarthen, supra note 28, at 119.
149. See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 701(b) (Robert E. Beck ed.,
1991).
150. See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. Dumars, A Survey of the Evolution
of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest
Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 351 (1989).
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measure the extent of actual injury.'' This means that the
transferee may not be able to quantify the long-range prospects
for water until after the transfer has been made and observed.
Such uncertainty has the potential to reduce the incentive to
make the capital investment normally required for large water
transfers.
Municipalities are particularly vulnerable to the implied
limitation doctrine. Cities may have relied on, and carried out,
the terms of the earlier change decree for many years, only to find
that their reliance was misplaced. Orr suggests that the earlier
decree is subject to being reopened and modified on the basis of
limitations "implied," but not articulated, at the time of the
decree. Presumably, the amounts consumed under the original
decree can be measured more accurately by today's sophisticated
techniques. Allowing rights which have been long relied upon to
be modified and re-quantified on the basis of implied limitations
could potentially jeopardize the users. The option to stop
supplying water is not available to municipalities, and rationing
is an unattractive alternative. Industrial users often cannot
feasibly cut back their water use. Encouraging cities and
industries to acquire rights to more water than they might need,
as a hedge against the reduction of those rights in the future, is
a policy difficult to justify.
Change decrees should not be limited, retroactively or
otherwise, unless there is potential injury to junior appropriators.
Nor should stream losses be overestimated as a substitute for
accurate assessments of the amount of actual consumption and
the characteristics of associated return flows. In Colorado, the
applicant for a change must demonstrate the absence of injury.
If the applicant makes a prima facie case, the opponent may then
affirmatively prove injury. In the absence of such proof, courts
should not merely assume that the proposed change will surely
injure someone,'5 2 and proceed to reduce the transferred right to
its historic consumptive use. Such a reduction not only fails to
adequately protect juniors in times of reduced streamflows; in
times of increased flows it provides the juniors with an unnecessary and undeserved windfall at the expense of the transferee. 15

151. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304 (6) (1997).
152. For an example of this approach at work, see FarmersHighline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954).
153. For an explanation of these hydrological dynamics, see Ellis, supra note

1998]

COLORADO WATER LAW

Moreover, it discourages water transfers at a time in the state's
history when the guiding policy of maximum utilization would
favor making transfers easier to accomplish, rather than more
difficult.
In order to appropriately protect transferred rights and the
holders of other vested rights, the courts need to avoid blind
adherence to the idea that only a reduction to historic consumptive use will suffice. Consumption, and its alter ego, return flows,
are uncertain as to timing, location on the stream, and their effect
on other appropriators, who are arrayed along the stream in a
complex web of priorities, diversion points, times of use, and
places of use. Effective consideration of these variables will
54
require sophisticated, flexible analysis.
Any system of limitations on water transfers should ideally
meet the tests suggested at the beginning of this paper: operate
simply and with low transaction costs to stimulate investment
and transfers; create predictability and certainty in connection
with water rights, including reasonable protection for the holders
of other vested rights, and the maintenance of priorities upon
transfer; and be perceived as fair, equitable, and effective by the
participants in the transfer as well as by the public at large.
Some of these goals are conflicting, and the achievement of
one may come at the expense of another. For example, protection
of vested rights, as it is currently practiced in Colorado, creates
uncertainty and requires detailed engineering, which in turn
drives up transaction costs and impedes the development of a
smoothly functioning market in water rights.
When such conflicts arise, the transfer system should be
capable of maintaining a desirable balance between the goals. As
the Colorado courts continue to fashion limitations on the
transfer and change of water rights, we will see whether the
concepts of "vested rights" and "optimal utilization" can come to
terms.

53.
154. This obviously has associated costs. The results of excessive "engineering'
in conjunction with transfers include increased transaction costs and more complex
administration, both undesirable outcomes. Such costs may be necessary in the
interest of more accurate return flow estimates.
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